pockets in other parts of the world, with respect to the rapid economic and cultural transition experienced in China since the 1990s. Part of this analysis must be a consideration of the effects of China's transition on migratory patterns, both internal and external, as well as on the changing role of Chinese language in the world. The issues regarding dual language signage must thus be analysed with a global regard. Far from being merely a matter of local or national policies regarding language and cultural diversity, the institution of such signage involves a regime of translation that not only structures the production of subjectivity in the present neoliberal conjuncture but also influences the geocultural configuration of the world.
Liverpool Road
A stroll down Ashfield's major shopping street is not the same experience it was at the beginning of the 1990s. At that time, Liverpool Road hosted a mix of Anglo, Italian and Greek shopping, reflecting the ethnic groups that composed the area's population.
Today about eighty-five percent of the shops along the street are Chinese small businesses, primarily restaurants and supermarkets. The prevalence of Chinese migration to this part of Sydney is directly linked to the Tiananmen Square massacre, that violent political rupture that marked the beginning of China's neoliberal transition (Wang 2003) . At the time, the Australian government granted permanent residency to some 42,000 Chinese students who were studying in the country. These visa holders were then able to bring out family from China under Australia's then family reunion migration scheme, meaning that numbers swelled to an approximate 100,000 by the end of the 1990s. Most of these migrants settled in Sydney and many made Ashfield their home. Due to the preponderance of Shanghainese among them, the area is sometimes known as Little Shanghai.
As opposed to the downtown Chinatown, established for well over a century as place where white Australians can go to eat Cantonese food, this is a place where it is possible to find restaurants serving cuisines from other regions of China, including, not surprisingly, Shanghai cuisine. Many of these establishments, which have erected street signs written exclusively in Chinese, cater to the local migrant populations as well as the increasing numbers of tourists who visit Sydney from mainland China. They are also magnets for cosmopolitan gourmets, who come mostly from the wealthier areas to the north and the east of the city, to sample the meals these restaurants have to offer. Recently, however, some members of the local white population, which has lived in the area for many years and experiences a sense of displacement due to the influx of Chinese migrants, have begun to express discomfort about the lack of street signs in English. A similar area to the south of the city, Hurstville, has legislated to make English signs mandatory, stipulating that Chinese characters on a sign cannot be larger than the letters of the Latin alphabet that comprise the English text. Ashfield has now followed suit. The local government has changed the regulations about signs, employing a Chinese speaking community worker and consulting academics to try to increase the presence of the English language on the suburb's main street.
In a report entitled Contact Zones, Amanda Wise (2004: 4) presents the results of research that investigated how elderly Anglo-Celtic and other long-term residents of Ashfield 'are experiencing cultural diversity and the rapid changes that the recent wave of Chinese migrants have brought to the suburb.' The study discovers that the 'most prominent area of discomfort among not only Anglo-Celtic senior citizens but also older long-term residents of other backgrounds-especially Greek, Italian, Polish and Indian-had to do with the predominance of non-English signage without translation along the Ashfield main street' (13). Apart from these street signs, residents expressed dismay at the presence of Chinese language posters covering shop windows, lack of design quality, the prevalence of phone card advertisements and Chinese language menus displayed in the windows of restaurants. Also reported were feelings of discomfort with the inability of some Chinese shopkeepers to speak English, their use of personal space, manners and social rituals. The report, which is careful also to offer positive stories about the experiences of long-term Ashfield residents in Chinese shops, concludes that these factors are perceived as an 'alienating barrier' by many older community members. It goes on to recommend an approach that would not ban Chinese signage along Liverpool Road but rather introduce 'a policy of translation for all signage in Ashfield where possible' (14).
As a result of the Contact Zones report, Ashfield Municipal Council began to work with Wise in the frame of a larger project to realise the goal of increasing the presence of translated signs along the street, assisting Chinese shopkeepers to make their premises more amenable to non-Chinese customers and generally enhancing the contact between the Chinese and other residents of Ashfield. Apart from intercultural meetings, this relations. But also, given the commercial setting, it reflects their growing importance in a service and consumer oriented economy increasingly driven by immaterial production.
One consistent argument provided in these materials as to why Chinese merchants should abide by their guidelines is that failure to do so might result in loss of customers.
Interestingly, in Hurstville, the area in the south of Sydney where government legislated to make Chinese shops display dual language signs, turnover in these businesses has increased by ten to twenty percent (Duffy 2006) . Similar figures are not available for
Ashfield, but perhaps the presence of tourists from China would make a difference. In any case, the parallel between the unilateral regime of translation that in 'multicultural'
Australia renders all other languages as English and the capitalist system that translates all 'relative' values into the general equivalent of money is no theoretical nicety but a practical matter with measurable effects.
Via Sarpi
On 12 behind the city of Wenzhou in the south of Zhejiang province (Thunø 1999) . When, in the 1980s, the economic boom in this area occasioned new opportunities for migration, mostly through clandestine means, the community in Milan was one among others in
Europe that accepted the newcomers. Often the new migrants, who were generally less skilled individuals than those making their way to Australia or the United States, were subjected to a period of debt bondage before they were able to make their way in the wider economy (Cologna & Mancini 2001) . Not only did whole villages in Qingtian begin to empty out, but across the 1990s, with the growth of internal migration in China, the composition of the migration flows also began to change. For instance, the movement of workers from Qingtian to the city of Sanming in Fujian province meant that migration routes also opened from this city to Milan. At the same time, paths opened through Russia for the movement of workers from the northern industrial city of Shenyang. Many of these migrants, primarily women, would become domestic workers for well-off families in Milan.
During the 1990s, the role of Chinese migrants in the Italian economy also began to It is not by chance that these forms of control are developing in Milan, one of the most productive cities in Italy. The control of the economy and in particular of the Chinese wholesalers occurs through the invention of strange forms of protectionism which are comprehensible only if one understands how this autonomous form of economy, far from being completely liberal, is directed toward 'ethnically' diverse people … These forms of control are ever more stringent but also ever more invisible. It is thus not by chance that the revolt in the Chinese quarter exploded because of a parking fine, since the Municipal Police in Milan have become that form of control deputised to establish new borderlines (my translation).
In There are many things one can say about such measures, which are not unrelated to the demands for dual language signage along Chinese-dominated streets in Sydney and
Milan. Most importantly, they signal a transition in debates about citizenship, which once focused on universalistic issues such as democracy, political rights and responsibilities, but now shift to include concerns about culture, which were formerly confined to the particular. In a sense, one can say that these debates have pushed to a limit the traditional paradox of modern citizenship, that is, that it invoked universal rights but only in a particular territory. With the explosion of this paradox, the question of translation has come to the fore. Since, in conceptual terms, the question of translation evades, or better cuts through, the unresolved (and quite possibly) irresolvable aporia of the universal and the particular. We can signal this by indicating that translation is instead a problem of the common and the singular. Here, the common is not understood as the sensus communis, which Kant, in his third Critique, defined as that 'subjective principle … which determines what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity ' (1982: 206) .
Rather it describes the experience of living in, through and between the transversal relations that compose the world. To experience the common is to approach 'the world as a heterogeneous space of intermundial intercourse, rather than thinking in the space of a community gathered around a univocal set of rules' (Karatani 2005: 99) . In other words, the common designates the space between languages, the space between cultures.
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The final section of this paper returns to this question of the common. Since translation is a practice as well as an epistemic relation, it is important also to discuss it in practical terms, by no means limited to the interactions between languages. Translation, in this sense, is a 'relational encounter between entities, affective modulations, the visible and invisible, perceptions and imperceptions, communication and the non-communicable' (Neilson & Rossiter 2008: 64) . With respect to patterns of Chinese migration in Australia and Italy, there is a need to consider how they relate to wider geopolitical, economic and cultural shifts as well as the relations between these processes on different geographical and temporal scales and in different affective registers.
What occurred on Milan's Via Sarpi, as much as it relates to the specific forms of cultural and economic control exercised in that city, must also be analysed in its transnational dimensions. At stake are not simply the local forms of protectionism, which are filtered through Lombard cultural mores, sometimes with a more racist face than others. These protectionist impulses are formed partly in reaction to the growth and international expansion of the Chinese economy, announced everywhere in Italy from the popular books of Federico Rampini (2006) to the erudite historical analyses of
Giovanni Arrighi (2007). But this same transition lies behind the current wellspring of
Chinese migration and not only on the international scale. It is important to remember that the bulk of Chinese migration has been rural-urban movement within the country and regulated by the so-called hukou system of housing registration (Cheng & Selden 1994) . To understand the events on Via Sarpi, it is necessary to ask who gets to be a Chinese wholesaler in Italy, how, where and by whom are the goods they sell produced, how do the trade networks that bring these goods to Europe function, and so on.
Relevant in this regard is that the area from which the vast majority of Milan's Chinese migrants hail was the centre of the so-called 'Wenzhou model' of industrial development in the 1980s and 1990s (Parris 1993) . Based on household industries, wage labour, commodity markets and self-organised credit associations, the rapid economic growth in Wenzhou produced the wealth that facilitated the migration of many to Europe, particularly Italy. Also significant are the changes to internal migration patterns to and from Zhejiang province, in which Wenzhou is located. In the period 1990-1995, the province was the seventh largest exporter of migrant labour to other provinces of China, including Zhejiang village, the largest migrant enclave in Beijing Only in the representation of translation can we construe the process of translation as a transfer of some message from "this" side to "that" side, as a dialogue between one person and another, between one group and another, as if dialogue should necessarily take place according to the model of communication. Thus the representation of translation also enables the representation of national or ethnic subjects, and, in spite of the presence of the translator, who is always in between, translation, no longer as difference or repetition but as representation, is made to discriminatorily posit one language unity against another (and one cultural "unity" and another) . (15) It is precisely such a representation of translation that is found on dual language street signs, whether understood to facilitate intercultural dialogue, as in the case of Liverpool Road, or to reinforce borderlines between cultural groups, as in the case of Via Sarpi.
Not only does such a representation of translation function according to the model of communication, prioritizing the transmission of a message to a certain language group (this shop sells that), but it also obscures differences within the unities figured as equivalents, for example, differences of dialect. Furthermore, as Sakai argues of the schema of co-figuration, these signs allow a national community to constitute itself as a subject by 'making visible the figure of an other with whom it engages in a translational relationship ' (1997: 15-16 ).
To further examine the question of translation and subjectivity, I would like to ask how this schema of co-figuration relates to the vision of co-citizenship that Balibar (2004a) advocates as a means of thinking of citizenship not only in terms of sovereignty and formal political belonging but also as a differentiated and partial notion that might be shaped in various ways to provide cultural, political and social rights. The concept of co-citizenship seeks to work over and across the kind of representation of translation Sakai finds implicit in the schema of co-figuration, imagining the production of political subjectivity within a civic and civil space where the stranger is not recognised as the enemy. At stake is the question of 'access to rather than simply entitlement to citizenship' (Balibar 2004a: 132) . Balibar attempts to imagine a form of democratic political membership, which, while necessarily bounded, is continuously recreated in a politics of civility in which border crossing becomes the very substance of citizenship. translation discussed by Sakai? More precisely, is the co-in co-figuration the co-in cocitizenship? Asking this question takes us to the heart of the nexus of translation and citizenship embodied in the debates about bilingual signs that provide the focus of this paper.
To interrogate the co-in this way is to raise the question of the common. It is to move into a space and time where relations precede identities and differences and can be anchored to neither a stable subjectivity nor a given human nature. Yet it is also to remember that the common is equivalent to neither the universal nor the public-that it implies, and issues the challenge to construct, a relation of value that does not pass through the general equivalent as described by Marx. It is thus neither a system of equality-which in its modern constitutional format was always vouchsafed by a simultaneous appeal to hierarchy-nor of civility, which although a relational notion assumes a bounded political space in which hospitality might be extended or tolerance exercised. Just as importantly, it is not a feature or capacity of community, whether understood as an ethnicized or nationalized organism or as an irreducibly differentiated construct (Nancy 1991; Esposito 1998) . Nor is the common, I might add in a counteractive note to some of the more recently pervasive modes of conceiving it, a positive and creative flux of vitalistic energy that is without content, open to appropriation, and thus refuses to reckon with the power of the negative that fails to disappear with the exhaustion of dialectical thought. To make only half a joke in Italian, I would like to call this question of co-figuration, co-citizenship and the common, the problem of the cococo (the term is a contraction of contratto contratto contratto, contract contract contract, and is widespread to refer to the figure of the precarious worker).
Only half a joke, I say, since the labour contract is central to the presence of migrants in countries like Australia and Italy, whether under the terms of Australia's 451 visa (for the entry of skilled migrants with employer sponsorship) or Italy's Bossi-Fini laws (where it provides the migrant's immunization against deportability). The co-in contract posits subjects who enter into an agreement on equal terms, a formal equality, which is then played out in terms of the production of surplus value, both absolute and relative, which involves relations of exploitation. It is such a contractual arrangement, I
would say, that underlies the co-figuration present on the signs in Sydney's Ashfield. In so far as these acts of translation promise recognition for an appropriate performance of difference, they embody what might be called the contract of Australian multiculturalism: a contract that guarantees the official recognition of differences that will not disturb the social ordering but also, as became clear in the Cronulla riots of December 2005 (involving violence against and on the part of Arab men), the continued racialization of differences that do disturb. If the Chinese merchant remains a disturbing difference in Milan, it is not necessarily due to the presence of a similar multicultural pact. But here again the labour contract is a central question, since in play is the question of which migrants get to become a small entrepreneurs in this most commercial of Italian cities.
To return to the question about the co-in co-figuration and co-citizenship then, it is necessary to answer both yes and no. Co-figuration assumes a time and space of beingalongside that can then generate infinite evaluations on the basis of differences. It is not necessarily free of the formal equality of the contractual agreement that precedes the act of labour exploitation. Likewise, co-citizenship, while it implies a mode of civil cohabitation that moves beyond the binary of citizen and foreigner, is not, insofar as it involves 'at the same time community and universality,' sufficient to vouchsafe the construction of the common. Balibar himself is clear that the emergence of cocitizenship will be a 'long and hazardous process,' which will not necessarily escape the 'intrinsic antinomies' of citizenship-that is, the tensions between rights and duties, membership and exclusion, participation and representation, formal equality and substantive inequalities, and so on (2004b: 21-23) . If the co-in co-figuration is the coin co-citizenship, it is not necessarily the co-of the common. To construct the common it may be necessary to become co-foreigners rather than co-citizens, to practice and imagine ways of being alongside or together that do not refer to the contractual model of recognition and rights and/or its correlate sovereign arrangements. It is to invent another mode of figuration, let's call it transfiguration, based in the realization that translation is never a finished practice-as implied by the finality of translated street signs-but a permanent process that abdicates the sovereign position of arbitration/neutrality to produce a space and time where the general equivalent is bypassed and the encounter with difference never complete.
